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The mechanism by which monetary policy is
transmitted to the real economy remains a central
topic of debate in macroeconomics. Considerable
research has recently examined the role played by
banks in the transmission of monetary policy aim-
ing at uncovering a credit channel and assessing
the relative importance of the money and credit
channels.
The money channel of monetary policy (also
known as the interest rate channel) is the primary
mechanism at work in conventional macro mod-
els: given some degree of price stickiness, an in-
crease in the nominal interest rates (for example)
translates into an increase in the real rate of inter-
est, and the user cost of capital. Theses changes
lead in turn to a postponement in consumption, or
a reduction in investment spending. But as
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) point out, the macro-
economic response to policy-induced interest rates
changes is considerably larger than implied by
conventional estimates of the interest elasticities of
consumption and investment. This observation
suggests that mechanisms other than the interest
rate channel may also be at work in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy.
One such alternative path is the so-called bank
lending or credit channel. Because banks rely on
reservable deposits as an important source of
funds, contractionary monetary policy, by reduc-
ing the aggregate volume of bank reserves, will re-
duce the availability of banks loans. And because a
significant subset of firms and households rely
heavily on bank financing, a reduction in loan sup-
ply will depress aggregate spending. It is this ad-
ditional transmission mechanism that is known in
the literature as the bank-lending channel.
Distinguishing the relative importance of the
money and credit channels is useful for various
reasons. First, understanding which financial ag-
gregates are impacted by monetary policy would
improve our understanding of the link between
the financial and the real sectors of the economy.
Second, a better understanding of the transmission
mechanism would help monetary authorities and
analysts to interpret movements in financial aggre-
gates. Finally, more information about the trans-
mission mechanism might lead to a better choice
of intermediate targets. In particular, if the credit
channel is an important part of the transmission
mechanism, then the banks’ asset items should be
the focus of more attention.
The importance of the credit channel depends
on the extent to which banks rely on deposit fi-
nancing and adjust their loan supply schedules
following changes in bank reserves (for a given
bank-dependency of the borrowers). The aim of
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As the credit or lending channel operates
through shifts in loan-supply schedules, uncover-
ing the credit channel implies distinguishing shifts
in loan-supply from shifts in loan demand sched-
ules brought about by monetary policy shocks.
At the empirical level, the bulk of the most rele-
vant literature has tried to uncover the lending
channel through the estimation of a reduced form
equation for the bank credit market, with variables
in first differences (i.e., stationarised variables).
This paper adds to this area of research, but de-
parts from previous studies on several aspects. In
particular it is argued that the reduced form ap-
proach requires strong identifying restrictions and
that it does not allow estimating the relevant pa-
rameters. As an alternative we suggest a “struc-
tural approach” which amounts to directly esti-
mate bank loan-supply schedules, with variables
in levels. For that purpose we resort to very recent
panel data cointegration techniques.(1)
The main conclusion of the paper is that there
is a banking lending channel in the transmission of
monetary policy in the Portuguese economy and
that the importance of this channel is larger for the
less capitalised banks. Size and liquidity do not
appear to be relevant bank characteristics in deter-
mining the importance of the lending channel.
The remainder of this paper is organised as fol-
lows. Section 2 briefly characterises the main
changes underwent by the Portuguese banking
sector during the eighties and the nineties. Section
3 describes the new approach aimed at identifying
and estimating the importance of the bank-lending
channel. Section 4 reports the empirical results for
Portugal and section 5 summarises the main con-
clusions.
2. MONETARY POLICY AND BANKING
SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL
DURING THE NINETIES
Since the early eighties the Portuguese financial
system underwent a fundamental liberalisation
process beginning with the opening up of the
banking sector to private initiative in 1983.(2) In
this period the first steps towards the elimination
of the administrative controls on interest rates and
credit growth were also taken. Moreover the ex-
plicit restrictions on the composition of banks’ as-
sets were removed and the legally imposed seg-
mentation of banking activities was gradually
eliminated, culminating in the establishment of
universal banking in 1992.
Under a significantly more competitive envi-
ronment the number of banks increased from 14 in
1984 to 27 1989 and 58 in 1997.(3) As in the other
European countries, international competition mo-
tivated several waves of take-overs, especially af-
ter 1994. However, the number of banks continued
to increase, entry being largely dominated by for-
eign institutions.
Another important step in the liberalisation of
the Portuguese banking system was the re-privat-
isation process that started in 1989, gradually
transferring to private management most of the
banking business. Since 1993, the main reforms
were directed to the harmonisation of procedures
and regulations within the EU, namely the capital
adequacy rules.
In the monetary and exchange rate policy front,
after having abandoned the crawling peg regime
in October 1990, the escudo joined the European
exchange rate mechanism in April 1992. In Decem-
ber of the same year the remaining restrictions on
international capital flows were removed.
The continuous decline of inflation since the
early nineties and the stability of the exchange rate
after 1993 allowed the sustained reduction of inter-
est rates. The process of nominal convergence in-
creased the prospects of EMU participation, which
in turn facilitated exchange rate stability and con-
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(1) For technical details the interested reader is referred to
Farinha and Marques (2001).
(2) The establishment of private investment companies, which
were later transformed into investment banks, was author-
ised in 1979.
(3) Excluding the co-operative institutions, whose number is rel-
atively large (160 in 1998), but only account for nearly 3 per
cent of the credit institutions’ total assets.vergence. These developments were reflected in a
substantial decrease in the exchange risk premium
of the escudo since mid-1995.
The sustained and significant reduction of both
short and long run nominal interest rates, per-
ceived as being permanent, reduced the liquidity
constraints of the economic agents thus contribut-
ing to the strong growth in overall credit demand
observed in this period.
Chart 1 shows aggregate quarterly figures on
the evolution of bank loans granted to the private
non-financial sectors of the economy as well as the
evolution of aggregate deposits held with the
banks by the private non-financial sectors.(4) After
the deceleration in the recession period between
1992 and 1994, in 1995-1997 credit resumed the up-
ward trend of the early nineties (average annual
growth rate in real terms of 14 per cent in this pe-
riod compared to 16 per cent in 1991) and strongly
accelerated in 1998 and 1999 (annual growth rate
in real terms of 24 per cent). Until 1994 deposits
behave very much like credit, but from 1995/1996
onwards they clearly exhibit a much smaller
growth rate (5.2 per cent in real terms during the
period 1995-1997 and 6 per cent in 1998/1999).
These apparently diverging developments in
credit and deposits have been the consequence of
the elimination of controls to the international cap-
ital flows, on the one hand, and a significant re-
duction of the exchange risk of the escudo on the
other, that enhanced the integration between the
Portuguese and the international money markets.
Chart 2 presents the evolution of the main
non-deposits financing sources. It can be seen that
the increase in the growth rate of loans coincided
with a decrease of the government bonds in banks’
portfolios and an increase in the (net) funds ob-
tained in the international money markets. Banks
partly substituted their investment in government
securities by credit to private non-financial sectors.
This whole process seems basically to have started
in 1995 and accelerated in 1998. In fact, the weight
of government securities in banks’ balance sheets
declined significantly from 19.5 per cent of total
assets in 1992 to 5.7 per cent in 1998 (13.4 per cent
in 1995).
3. IDENTIFYING THE BANK LENDING
CHANNEL — AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
At the empirical level, the bulk of the most rele-
vant literature has tried to uncover the lending
channel through the estimation of a reduced form
equation for the bank credit market, with variables
in differences (see, for instance, Kashyap and Stein
(1995), Favero et al. (1999)). The estimated equation
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(4) The figures analysed in this section have been computed
from non-consolidated data on the sample of 18 bank con-
glomerates for which consistent series throughout the period
1990-1998 may be obtained. In December 1998, the credit and
deposits in these 18 banks amounted to 96 per cent and 98
per cent of the total credit and total deposits, respectively.
This is also the sample of banks used in the econometric esti-
mations presented below.is generally a dynamic version (in differences) of
the static model:
 ln / ln ln CP y y z r
t tt i t t        01 2 3
        45 6 7 rz z z ti t t ti t i t [1]
where  CP
t / stands for bank loans (in real
terms), yt for a scale variable (usually GDP), t for
the inflation rate, rt for the monetary policy inter-
est rate and zit for a measure of a bank specific
characteristic (size, liquidity or capitalisation).
Under this approach, which we shall denote as
the “reduced form approach”, the fact that the esti-
mated 3 is (significantly) negative and 4 is (sig-
nificantly) positive is taken as evidence of the exis-
tence of the bank-lending channel. The idea is that
if the effect of monetary policy on bank lending is
larger for the smaller, less liquid or less capitalised
banks this can only be due to the existence of the
bank-lending channel.
In order to motivate the alternative econometric
approach we develop a simple IS/LM model for
the money and credit markets, which draws
heavily on Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The
model, which in our view allows a better under-
standing of the identifying restrictions underlying
the reduced form equation [1], is composed of four
equations: money demand (total deposits held
with a typical bank), money supply, loan demand
and loan supply schedules. For space reasons we
skip the details of the model and discuss only the
loan-supply schedule, which reads as follows (be-
low each coefficient is the corresponding expected
sign according to economic theory):
  

 ln / ln / ln /
()
C P DP DP z it
s
it it it    





  345 li tt t [2]
Equation [2] postulates that banks loan supply
in real terms, (CP / ), depends on the level of total
deposits in real terms held by the private sector
with the banks, DP / , on the inflation rate, t,a s
a measure of uncertainty in the economy as well as
on the loan, lt, and bond, it, interest rates.(5) Assets
held by banks in the form of bonds are seen as
substitutes for loans, held mainly for liquidity rea-
sons.
The null  1 0 	 in [2] captures the idea that
banks cannot shield their loan portfolios from
changes in monetary policy, i.e., from changes in
deposits brought about by monetary policy and
plays a central role in our analysis as it constitutes
a key necessary condition for the existence of the
lending channel. If banks were able to replace lost
deposits with other sources of funds, such as cer-
tificates of deposits or new equity issues, or by
selling securities, we would expect  1 not to be
significantly different from zero.
The term   2 ln / DP z
it it intends to capture the
idea that shifts in the supply curve brought about
by monetary policy changes depend on some
banks’ specific characteristics (size, liquidity,
capitalisation, etc.) measured by zit. In principle
we expect that  2 0 
 so that loan-supply shifts are
larger for small, less liquid or less capitalised
banks.
To see how the lending channel operates in the
model, let us assume, for instance, that the central
bank increases the discount rate. This will reduce
the equilibrium quantity of money in the economy,
i.e., deposits in our model, through the interaction
between money supply and money demand. In
turn, the drop in deposits held by the private sec-
tor with the banks shifts the loan supply schedule
inwards if  1 0  in [2]. It is this additional trans-
mission mechanism — the inward shift in supply
of loans — which is known in the literature as the
bank-lending channel.
Also important is the coefficient  3 as it deter-
mines the slope of the supply curve. Of course for
that inward shift to occur the supply curve cannot
be horizontal. In other words we need the addi-
tional assumption that  3 in [2] is finite. Thus to
test the existence of the credit channel and evalu-
ate its importance we need to estimate  1 and  3
in equation [2]. The credit channel is the more im-
portant the larger  1 (the larger the extent to
which banks rely on deposit financing) and the
smaller  3.
Solving the model for the four endogenous
variables one obtains a reduced form equation for
bank credit that looks very much like equation [1].
From such equation it is possible to discuss the re-
strictions on the coefficients of both money and
loan demand and supply schedules, which are
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(5) As explained below this supply schedule may be justified in
theoretical terms in the context of a profit-maximizing bank,
in which the amount of deposits is out of the control of the
bank being determined by central bank monetary policy.necessary in order to guarantee that proper con-
clusions on the existence of the lending channel
can be drawn from a reduced form equation such
as [1].(6)
In our opinion, some of these restrictions are
very stringent. For this reason we will follow a dif-
ferent approach which consists of directly estimat-
ing the supply curve [2]. This alternative approach
has the advantage of allowing one to get direct
point estimates of the relevant coefficients, which
is not the case of the “reduced form” approach.
We assume that deposits as well as the bond in-
terest rate are exogenous at the bank level, so that
we may stick to a “structural model” consisting
only of a loan demand equation and a loan supply
equation. The assumption of deposits exogeneity
is probably the major limitation of our approach,
but, in fact, this seems to be an issue deserving fur-
ther research also at the theoretical level.
Of course our model also raises an identifica-
tion as well as an estimating issue. Given that it is
composed of only two “structural” equations with
I(1) variables the identification problem amounts
at guaranteeing that we are able to distinguish the
supply from the demand equation. We may dis-
cuss the identifying restrictions by resorting to the
cointegration approach. Within the cointegration
framework we may consider our two-equation
model as corresponding to the long-run equilib-
rium relations of a two equation cointegrating
VAR model with exogenous regressors. In this
context we need to assume the existence of two
single cointegrating vectors (one for the supply
schedule and one for the demand equation) and
that the exogenous regressors are themselves not
cointegrated (see for instance, Johansen (1995) and
Pesaran and Shin (1998)). In this case, the identify-
ing condition requires that we impose one restric-
tion in each cointegrating vector (besides the nor-
malization condition). This restriction may of
course be a zero coefficient restriction, which
amounts at excluding one exogenous regressor
from each equation. In other words, the basic idea
is that the supply curve is identified provided the
loan demand curve includes at least one explana-
tory variable that does not enter the supply equa-
tion. Under the assumption that deposits and the
bond interest rate are exogenous at the bank level,
we see that the supply curve [2] is identified pro-
vided we assume that the demand curve includes
a scale variable (GDP, for instance) as an addi-
tional regressor (in turn, the demand curve would
be identified because the supply curve includes
 ln / DP as an additional exogenous regressor).(7)
Let us now address the estimation issue. So far
in the literature the empirical models, using panel
data, have been estimated with variables in first
differences to circumvent the potential non-
stationarity problem arising from the time-series
dimension of the data. However it is well known
that in most cases this approach does not solve the
inconsistency problem, especially if the estimated
model still includes specific effects and lagged en-
dogenous variables.(8)
On the other hand, this approach neglects from
the start the possibility of a levels relation among
the relevant variables. In other words these ap-
proach discards the possibility of a long run effect
of monetary policy on deposits and credit. This is
at odds with the usual approach in the literature,
which postulates levels relationships for the
money and credit equations.
We estimate our model in levels using recently
developed cointegration techniques for panel data.
Some of these techniques allow obtaining (super)
consistent estimators for the parameters of our
supply equations even when some of the
regressors are correlated with the residuals.(9)
These, being static equations should be seen as
cointegrating relations, whose coefficients are the
long run effects.
Our estimated loan-supply functions are gener-
alisations of equation [2] in that they include two
additional regressors: bank capital and the cost of
external financing alternative to deposits and capi-
tal, st. The basic equation reads as:
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(6) For a lengthy discussion of these “identifying” restrictions
see Farinha and Marques (2001).
(7) We note that these would also be the identifying restrictions
should we approach the identification issue within the con-
ventional stationary framework (see Intrilligator et al. (1996)
and Zha (1997)).
(8) See Alvarez and Arellano (1998) for a survey on the asymp-
totic properties of various estimators, in dynamic panels,
with stationary regressors.
(9) On this issue, see for instance, Phillips and Moon (1999), Kao
and Chiang (2000), Pedroni (1996), Pesaran, Shin and Smith
(1999), Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran (2000), Pesaran and Shin
(1995). Interesting surveys on the subject are Phillips and
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We may justify this generalisation on econo-
metric as well as on economic grounds. From an
econometric point of view the introduction of capi-
tal in [3] aims at preventing that deposits appear
as the single “scale” variable, which could bias the
results towards favouring the conclusion of the ex-
istence of the credit channel. From an economic
point of view we may justify equation [3] in the
context of the model developed in Courakis (1988),
in which banks maximise profits (by deciding on
the amounts of assets and liabilities they control)
conditional on the items they cannot control (capi-
tal and/or deposits, for instance). Under this
framework our loan supply can be seen as result-
ing from a profit maximising behaviour of a bank
in which both deposits and capital are treated as
exogenous. The bank is assumed to choose the vol-
ume of credit, securities and external finance, in
order to maximise the expected profits for a given
level of deposits and capital.
The possibility of other forms of external fi-
nancing alternative to deposits and capital (money
market funds, certificates of deposits, etc.) is taken
into account by introducing into the credit equa-
tion an interest rate representing the cost of such
funds, st.(10)
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE USING
PORTUGUESE MICRO BANK DATA
In the estimations we use balance sheet infor-
mation on a sample of 18 bank conglomerates for
which consistent quarterly data throughout
1990/1-1998/4 is available.(11)
As expected, given the evolution of credit and
deposits described in section 2, some preliminary
tests showed that in the last years of the sample
the relation between credit granted to private sec-
tor and deposits underwent a huge structural
break. In order to minimise the corresponding
damaging consequences for the estimated models
we excluded the data for 1998 from the sample. So,
we finally used 8 years of quarterly data for 18
bank conglomerates.
We estimated our equations by POLS, (Pooled
OLS) PCOLS, (Panel bias corrected OLS) DPOLS
(Dynamic panel OLS) and the PFMOLS (Panel
fully modified OLS) estimators (see, Kao and
Chiang (2000)).(12) The results obtained by the first
three estimators are basically similar. In such re-
gressions most coefficients appear non-signi-
ficantly different from zero or wrong signed. In
contrast the results supplied by the PFMOLS esti-
mator are quite reasonable in terms of both sign
and magnitude. The fact that we are using a small
sample, the correlation in the residuals as well as
the endogeneity of some of the regressors proba-
bly explains these differences.(13) For this reason,
below we only present and comment the PFMOLS
results.
The estimated equations are displayed in Table
1. Below each coefficient is the computed t-statis-
tic, which is asymptotically normal distributed.
For each equation several cointegration tests were
computed. The null of a unit root in the residuals
was always rejected, so that all the equations pre-
sented in Table 1 are valid cointegrating relations.
Column 1 displays the results of our basic spec-
ification [3]. It can readily be seen that all the coef-
ficients are statistically significant and exhibit the
expected sign for a loan-supply function. Even
though the estimated coefficients of lt and st do not
seem to be much different in absolute terms, the
null hypothesis of their being equal in magnitude
is statistically rejected. In fact the t-statistics for
this restriction are always larger than two (see,
bottom line of Table 1).
Given that the coefficient of  ln / DP ,  1,i s
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(10)Actually the reported equations in the next section only in-
clude two (and not three interest rates). Due to strong
colinearity we are not able to separately estimate the three co-
efficients. We dropped it from the equation, as in fact it
turned out not to be significant in preliminary regressions.
(11)During the nineties a process of take-overs has taken place.
However many of the institutions involved did not effec-
tively merged, but rather constituted bank conglomerates.
(12)We used the NPT 1.2 econometric package recently devel-
oped by Chiang and Kao (2001).
(13)The properties specific to the FMOLS estimator probably ex-
plain the differences in the results. For instance, it is known
that the POLS estimator is consistent, but not super-
consistent, if the regressors are correlated with the residuals
and may exhibit substantial biases in finite samples. Simula-
tion results also show that the PCOLS estimator does not sig-
nificantly improve over simple POLS (see, for instance,
Baltagi and Kao (2000)). In contrast PFMOLS is super-
consistent even when the regressors are correlated with the
residuals.significantly positive and the coefficient of lt,  3,i s
finite we conclude that there is evidence of the
existence of a bank-lending channel in the trans-
mission of monetary policy in Portuguese bank
data.
By comparing the results in columns 1 and 2
we also see that the conclusion on the existence of
the credit channel does not depend on whether or
not the estimated regression includes bank capital
as an additional regressor.
The remaining regression results reported in
Table 1 interact the explanatory variables in our
basic equation with three bank specific characteris-
tics, which are usually seen as potential important
sources of bank heterogeneity: size, liquidity and
capitalisation. These three variables are denoted
by zit in Table 1. In the case of size and capital-
isation the zit variable is taken in the form of dif-
ferences from each time period average, i.e.,
zx
N








where xit stands for the log of total assets, as a
measure of size and for the capital ratio as a
capitalisation indicator. By defining size and
capitalisation in this way we ensure that the zit
variable captures pure differential effects. In case
of liquidity the zit variable is taken in the form of
differences from a per-bank average, i.e.,
zx
T








where xit stands for the liquidity ratio as a mea-
sure of bank liquidity.(14) This definition allows
one to account for periods of general (positive or
negative) excess liquidity for the banking sector as
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Table 1
PFMOLS ESTIMATES OF EQUATION [3]
(1) (2)
Size Liquidity Capitalisation
Regressors.......... (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
...................
 ln / DP
itl n ........ 0.615 0.721 0.676 0.49 0.633 0.717 0.409 0.713
(24.83) (28.99) (14.61) (10.86) -18.38 -21.34 (14.97) (26.26)
 ln / . DP z
it it ....... 0.156 0.049 -0.051 0.027 -3.947 -0.747
(8.16) (2.80) (-0.75) (0.54) (-16.23) (-6.97)
 ln / KP
it .......... 0.156 -0.525 0.13 0.47
(3.00) (-10.11) (2.74) (7.89)
 ln / . KP z
it it ....... -0.101 0.022 6.462
(-3.03) (0.13) (12.14)
lt .................. 19.318 16.734 17.953 22.262 14.787 12.839 22.187 16.617
(15.00) (12.96) (16.14) (18.91) (12.1) (10.34) (18.01) (12.4)
lz ti t................ 0.523 101.926 111.513 24.639
(0.81) (8.40) (9.30) (1.79)
st .................. -15.905 -14.442 -11.767 -16.11 -11.835 -10.801 -17.096 -13.595
(-11.85) (-10.77) (-10.22) (-13.24) (-9.55) (-8.59) (-13.63) (-10.08)
sz ti t ................ -1.41 -72.969 -79.466 13.953
(-2.26) (-6.38) (-7.10) (1.04)
t ................. -2.504 -1.114 -7.538 -6.476 -0.47 0.635 -5.114 -3.069
(-2.24) (-1.02) (-7.66) (-6.45) (-0.45) (0.61) (-4.70) (-2.76)
zit ................. 0.411 0.214 -8.213 -9.005 -6.589 -0.444
(5.04) (3.55) (-13.27) (-14.26) (-5.15) (-1.32)
Spread restriction.... (4.3) (2.98) — (8.79) — — — (3.81)
Legend:
t-statistics in parenthesis.
 ln / DP= natural log of total deposits deflated by the consumer price index.
 ln / KP = natural log of total capital deflated by the consumer price index.
lt = interest rate on long term loans in decimals (five year loans).
st = short term interest rate on Portuguese money market in decimals.
 t = inflation rate in decimals (fourth differences of log CPI).
zit = measure of bank specific characteristic (size, liquidity or capitalisation).
(14)The rational for equation [5] is explained in Farinha and Mar-
ques (2001).whole, which is likely to have been the case in the
Portuguese banking system, during most of the
sample.
Let us now take the model in column 3 of Table
1. The fact that the coefficient on  ln / DP z
it it is
positive means that the coefficient on deposits is
lower for small banks and so in the Portuguese
case the supply of loans of small banks is less de-
posit dependent than that of large banks. In other
words, everything else equal, we would conclude
that the credit channel is less important for small
banks. However, we saw in section 3 that in order
to evaluate the relative importance of the bank
lending-channel we need to look at the coefficient
of deposits as well as at the coefficient of the loans
interest rate. Thus, in terms of Table 1, to evaluate
the relative magnitude of the lending channel for
two different banks one has to look both at the co-
efficient of  ln / DP z
it it and the coefficient of lz ti t ,
as the effect of a decrease in the coefficient of de-
posits could be offset by an increase on the coeffi-
cient of the loans-interest rate, and vice-versa.
As it turns out that the coefficients on the inter-
action terms lz ti tand sz ti tare both not statistically
different from zero we may definitely conclude
that small Portuguese banks are less dependent on
deposits than large banks or, in other words, the
bank-lending channel appears to be less important
for small banks.(15) We recognise that the lack of
evidence of larger non-deposit external financing
costs for smaller banks does not come as a large
surprise in the Portuguese case. Portugal is a small
country with a not very large number of banks in
which even the smaller banks are large enough not
to be discriminated in the access to markets for
non-deposits external funds.
Columns 5 and 6 display the models with li-
quidity as the bank specific characteristic. The first
important point to note is that the coefficient of
 ln / DP z
it it and that of  ln / KP z
it it are not sta-
tistically different from zero. The fact that the coef-
ficient of  ln / DP z
it it is zero means that in the
Portuguese case the dependence of banks on de-
posits does not vary with the bank liquidity ra-
tio.(16) On the other hand, it turns out that the coef-
ficient of the loans interest rate is lower for illiquid
banks(17) (as the coefficient of lz ti tis positive) and
this means that the supply curve is flatter. This re-
duces the importance of the credit channel for the
illiquid banks. This apparently counterintuitive re-
sult is not surprising because the Portuguese
banks displayed a huge liquidity ratio at the be-
ginning of the sample period due to the existence
of credit ceilings and compulsory minimum ratios
of public debt. Moreover, there is some evidence
suggesting that it might have been the case that
the banking system as a whole operated under
overall excess liquidity conditions during most of
the sample period. So, it may well be the case that
the coefficients of lz ti tand of sz ti tappear signifi-
cantly different from zero because they are captur-
ing the effects of a potential structural break occur-
ring in the period, as we shall see below. All in all,
a sensible conclusion, in this case, seems to be that
liquidity in the Portuguese banks, during the nine-
ties has not played the role of a shield against
monetary policy shocks.
Columns 7 and 8 display the two models esti-
mated with the capitalisation ratio as the interac-
tion variable. In this case we have the coefficient of
 ln / DP z
it it negative and the coefficients of lz ti t
and sz ti tequal to zero, and thus, we can definitely
conclude that the lending-channel appears to be
more important for less capitalised banks.
Of course, these conclusions are valid under the
implicit assumption that the models estimated in
Table 1 are stable. But if we look again at Charts 1
and 2 we immediately realise that during 1996 and
1997 the credit growth rate increased relative to
the deposits growth rate, coinciding with the in-
crease in the external non-deposits funds coming
from abroad. This fact raises the question of
whether the conclusions above still apply once we
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(15)We note that the coefficient of  ln / KPin column [3] is
wrong signed, but the above conclusion still holds for the
model in column [4], which was estimated after dropping
 ln / KP it and  ln / KPz it it and after checking that the coeffi-
cients on lz ti tand sz ti twere still statistically not different
from zero. However in column [4] the estimated coefficient
of  ln / DP z it it is much smaller and the t-statistic is not very
high in relative terms.
(16)We note that this conclusion depends on the fact that the li-
quidity variable is defined as in [5]. If we rather define li-
quidity as in [4] the coefficient of  ln / DP z it it appears
significantly different from zero and negative. This result
shows that the way the zit is defined really matters for the
empirical analysis.
(17)Note that an illiquid bank is one for which the current liquid-
ity ratio is below the sample average liquidity ratio.allow for the possibility of a structural break in the
last two years of the sample.
To investigate this issue we “interacted” the
variables in our basic specification (3) with a
dummy variable, which is zero for the first six
years of data (1990/1 to 1995/4) and equals 1 for
the two last years of the sample (1996/1 to
1997/4).
The evidence strongly suggests the existence of
a structural break occurring in the two last years of
the sample, as the coefficients of the variables of
the model interacted with the dummy variable are
in general significantly different from zero. How-
ever the most important point is that all the rele-
vant conclusions drawn above from Table 1 re-
main valid. In particular we still conclude that the
dependence of banks on deposits does not vary
with the bank liquidity ratio and that the lending
channel is more important for the less capitalised
banks.(18)
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the existence of a
bank-lending channel using quarterly data on the
Portuguese banks for the period 1990-1997. This
transmission channel operates through shifts in
the bank-loan supply schedules brought about by
the reduction in the availability of bank deposits
following a contractionary monetary policy shock.
In contrast to previous approaches which basi-
cally resort to (dynamic) reduced form equations
for bank credit with variables in differences, this
paper proposes an alternative approach by esti-
mating directly a loan supply schedule with vari-
ables in levels, thereby exploring recent cointe-
gration results for nonstationary panel data.
We conclude for the existence of a bank-lending
channel in Portuguese data and that the impor-
tance of this channel is larger for the less capital-
ised banks. Size as well as liquidity does not ap-
pear to be relevant bank characteristics to deter-
mine the importance of the bank-lending channel.
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